Introduction

India has always been a pluralist country of rich diverse cultures and practices. However, with diversity comes conflict and Indian history shows how religion has very often been used to incite violence and hate.  The pluralistic and secular characteristic of India has been facing its most intense challenge as of late—with communal forces attempting to create an environment where violence could erupt at any given time between the majority Hindu and minority communities, specifically Muslims, along the lines of religion. Sudha Pai and Sajjan Kumar (2018) in their work on Uttar Pradesh, show that frequent, low-intensity communal clashes pegged on routine everyday issues and resources help establish a permanent anti-Muslim prejudice among Hindus–thereby legitimizing majoritarian rule in the eyes of an increasingly polarized, intolerant and entitled majority community of Hindus. The process of communalisation that has been taking place during the reign of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has increased fear and insecurity among the minority communities (The Wire 2022). While the low-intensity communal clashes still persist, an additional tool utilised to erode harmony and peace is religious processions (Yatras). The organisers of these processions receive backing from militant Hindutva organisations and claim that their processions are integral to the practice of their faith and a celebration of God (Chakraborty 2023). The procession is portrayed as an innocent ritual with the responsibility for the ensuing violence placed on the victims of the violence that occurs through the procession, mainly the minority muslim community. These religious processions carried out by militant Hindutva groups such as the Bajrang Dal and Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) have become more and more frequent in the past few years, leaving behind a trail of violence and destruction. 

One such procession which created quite a stir was the Brajmandal Jalabhishek Yatra that was carried out in Nuh, Haryana on July 31, 2023. As the procession was being carried out in Nuh, communal clashes broke out between the members of the procession and the Muslim residents of that area. The harrowing aspect of the communal clash was that the violence boiled over and made its way to Gurugram (Jain 2023), a prosperous business hub, right next to India’s capital Delhi. All of this took place one month before India hosted the G20 summit in Delhi (Mogul and Farooqui 2023). Such is the sociopolitical climate of India and callous attitude of the administration, which enables such communal clashes to take place. India is home to some two hundred million Muslims, one of the world’s largest Muslim populations but a minority in the predominantly Hindu country. Since India’s independence, Muslims have often faced discrimination, prejudice, and violence, despite constitutional protections. It is clear that anti-Muslim sentiments have heightened under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which has pursued a Hindu nationalist agenda since elected to power in 2014. Since Modi’s reelection in 2019, the government has pushed controversial policies that critics say explicitly ignore Muslims’ rights, restrict religious freedoms, and are intended to disenfranchise millions of Muslims (Maizland 2024). 

In 2024, it was announced that the Brajmandal Jalabhishek Yatra would be organised again. However, the 2024 iteration of the religious procession went through Nuh peacefully and the procession concluded without a single incident of communal violence. This paper aims to inquire into why no violence took place when the same procession was organised in 2024. Drawing on fact finding reports and interviews with the residents of Nuh, this paper looks into the main differences in the attitudes and manner in which the administration and the police operated, elements within the religious procession that were present in 2023 and not in 2024, and the ground level context that spurred communal tensions. Thus, it is important for us to understand how a religious procession, a ritual act which is supposed to be spiritual in nature, instead becomes a preliminary act of instigation which leads to communal clashes and has larger implications for social stratification and communalism.

India’s History of Syncretic Traditions: A Deterrent to Communalism

In the present, there are many attempts to rewrite Indian history in order to portray a clean divide between the various religions and communities that are present in India. This has been a project that the Indian Right-wing partakes in whenever it is in power. Thapar (2005) writes about how the central government under the rule of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) during the years of 1999 to 2004, attempted to rewrite and change history in textbooks. This was done with the intent of formulating an Indian identity which would be synonymous with the Hindu religion and would portray the minority Muslim and Christian religions as foreign influences which came to conquer the Indian landscape. Thapar writes about how these attempts to rewrite history are closely tied to the project of religious nationalism that the Indian Right-wing wants to spread across the masses. However, if we look at the history of India, we will see how syncretic traditions have been ever present and crucial in providing India its pluralistic identity.

Bayly (1985) writes about how during the 18th century, ruling classes engaged in local and state building to form relationships between the religious practices of major faiths. He gives the example of the Maratha rulers and how after 1740, they shared a lot of commonalities with the Mughal empire. The Maratha temples would incorporate a lot of Islamic characteristics in their architecture, the Maratha chieftains would be painted in court dress by Mughal artists, indicating that they were domesticated into the Mughal lifestyle. Muslim rulers would always try to keep close association with saints as their relationship with the sovereignty of the Khilafat was very distant. A similar tendency was witnessed among the Maratha chiefs, with saint Mansur Shah being a mentor (pir) of the great war-leader Mahaji Scindia, and also his chief companion. Barnett (1980) in his mapping of the history in North India as the ruling class would change, writes about how the Muslim rulers of emerging regional states would link themselves to the local temples and festivals, though this was done more discreetly than their Hindu counterparts. For example, the rulers of Awadh would rely on the donations given by the Vaishnavite priests and Gosains of Muttra and Ajodya as the court of Awadh would foster a Shia culture and thus, withdrew patronage from many of the Sunni shrines in the vicinity. 

It is interesting to note that mughal rulers would give liberal grants for the construction of Hindu temples and had also adopted Hindu traditions. This did not stop here as the educational system that had been established by the mughal state would impart education relevant for both Muslim and Hindu students (Mustafa 2023).  While the ruling class had their contribution, it was the emergence of an all-India military culture which was the most important factor in the formation of syncretic traditions. Bayly notes how many Muslims and Hindus in later mughal campaigns would make special provisions in order to facilitate prayers for both religions. He also notes how even though there were ideological movements within Islam in the later 18th century that were to some extent against syncretic practices, it was due to the comradeship present in the warrior culture of the army that any such movement had no effect. 

It is not the case that the pre-colonial era was a time of complete peace and religious harmony; however, Bayly’s arguments disprove those who would endorse the two-nation theory. This work suggests that there are preconditions in social structures for sustained communal violence. In the context of India, it would be the chance clashing of religious festivities or shifting in political power which would lead to larger communal conflict if it coincided with larger political and economic power. It was only then that social and economic groups would perceive themselves as members of larger communities.

Rise of Communalism: Classification of Communities and Politicization of Rituals

Before the entry of the British administration, there were low level conflicts which would not have larger connotations of community behind them. The British government needed to establish an administrative system which would enable them to rule the Indian subcontinent with the entirety of its diversity. It was the creation of the administrative apparatus that began the policy of divide and rule in order to exert firm control over the diverse and plural Indian population (Stewart 1951). Christopher (1988) shows how divide and rule was a policy that was used by the British in other colonies that they had in Asia and Africa. The enumeration and categorization of the Indian population as a part of the census exercise, solidified the divide between the Hindu and the Muslim, making them exclusive categories and erasing the rich history of syncretic traditions. Bhagat (2001) shows how sustained communal hatred rose after the categorization of Hindus and Muslims for the purpose of the census and for the effective governance of the British administration. The British administration ignored the heterogeneity that existed among the Hindu and Muslim communities and through the census project attempted to homogenize them. Bernard S. Cohn (1968) demonstrates to us that the use of the census by the British administration coupled with colonial anthropology, gave rise to communalism during the colonial period.

Frietag (1980), while studying the significance of religious symbols in the formation of Hindu communities in North India, writes about how in order to participate within British governmental structures, there were efforts to reconfigure the ideological definitions and organizational format of local groups. These efforts would allow for entry into the opportunities provided by the British administration. This led to explorations into the definition of communities during the late 19th century and during the beginning of the 20th century, when we see community identities that depended heavily on religious symbols. However, when the process of finding the common denominator among these identities in connection with their beliefs and practices started, it became possible to infuse political meanings into the communities that were formulated. It is the same political meaning, that Freitag (1980) writes created a demand for a separate state on the basis of religion, leading to the partition. 

Thus, began the era of larger communities divided on the basis of religion, leading to relegation of syncretic traditions and local level identities.  Larger levels of classifications arose and marked the end of a time when religious rituals or practices were performed specific to kinship units with now the rituals representing the larger community that was formulated. With rituals now not being located within a local context, conflicts that arose between members of a local space would now be connected to the communities they belonged to, Hindu or Muslim. 

Historicizing Politicised Religious Processions in India: Their Origin and Purpose

The use of religious processions to incite conflict has been present in the Indian context since as early as 1893. The Ganpati festival processions are the first instance of how religious processions were weaponised in order to give rise to a form of “Hindu consciousness” and create social divide. Tejani (2007) writes about how the Ganpati festival’s transformation was an attempt to reinvent and politicise an established ritual which would prevent Hindus from participating in festivals of the other community. The festival, apart from creating a separation based on religion, also severed long-standing economic ties shared within the space’s members. Different Hindu traders who would interact with the Muslims, now have their attention devoted to the Ganpati festivals, creating insular communities. The main impact of the Ganpati festival, Tejani writes, was the creation of an ideological space that would allow for the rhetoric of inter-community hate and language that would identify the Muslims as outsiders to India. While the Ganpati festivals saw reduced participation over the years, the idea behind the festival has been revived and used to incite communal tensions among the masses.

We see that communalism manifests itself in the society through the use of religious festivals especially processions in order to intimidate the minority Muslim community. Ghanshyam Shah (1970) suggests that communal organisations such as the Rashtriya Samiti Sangh coordinated with the local administration and the police to organise and incite communal violence. Shah emphasises that the most disturbing manifestation was the use of religious processions in front of mosques and playing music filled with Islamophobic lyrics, either stating that India is a Hindu country or that the Muslims should vacate (Zaffar and Pandit 2022). The use of religious processions and music by communal organisations in order to intimidate or incite communal violence was also seen during the politicisation of the Ganpati festivals in the context of Maharashtra during the 1890s as written by Tejani (2007). Slowly, we see how processions are used more and more by political actors with the support of communal militant organisations as time passes by.

By contextualising the history of how politicised religious processions rose in prominence and were used by militant Hindutva groups, we can see how the word “yatra” now either has the connotation of a pilgrimage or procession carried out by a religious institution or an ethnoreligious demonstration by Hindu militant organisations (Jaffrelot 2009). Dr. Christophe Jaffrelot theorised about how the Hindu pilgrimage is used politically due to its territorial characteristics that allow for it to be viewed in ethnonationalist terms in the case of pan-Indian yatras. It is for this reason that majoritarian elements try to use processions for their own political ends and to spread communalism. 

Jaffrelot (1998) describes Hindu processions as miniature level pilgrimages that are organised to worship a deity. The two important features that these processions display is the fact they seem to be socially inclusive, with members of all castes taking part in them, and that they aid in the process of demarcating space which can be labeled as exclusively belonging to the Hindu community. It is these features that make processions so attractive to militant Hindu groups as they view them with the potential of turning them into Hindu activist events, in the same manner that was done by Bal Gangadhar Tilak. 

Jaffrelot (2009) historicizes various yatras that were employed by Hindu activists to first unite the Hindu nationalist movements and then employ the processions to foster communalism. He writes about the Ekatmata Yatra (March for Unity) that was carried out by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), an offshoot of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, to ensure that the Hindu populations across areas would engage with each other and this would help in fostering unity. The two aims of the Rath Yatra were to counter the increased divisions that were becoming apparent among the Hindus due to the recommendations given by the Mandal Commission, and to mobilize Hindus around the issue of the Ram Mandir in Ayodhya. The overall aim was to effectively unite the Hindu community against their common enemy, the Muslims. 

There is a clear political purpose to the use of processions, whether in the context of the Ganpati festivals during the colonial period, or during the mid-1960s where Hindu processions were carried out in front of mosques or more recently when they were used by Hindu activists in order to demarcate space as exclusively theirs. In all different contexts, we see common features of provocation, violence, and anti-minority sentiment present.

Modern-Day Avatar of Religious Processions: Planned and Organised Violence

When the Hindu festivals of Ram Navami and Hanuman Jayanti were celebrated in 2022, the country again witnessed communal violence on a large scale. A detailed report prepared by Citizens & Lawyers Initiative (2023) on the clashes titled the “Routes of Wrath: Weaponizing Religious Processions” (The Hindu 2023) shows how communal violence occurred in nine states across India while there were instances of provocation and low-level violence in another three states. The violence was triggered in the conflict-affected areas due to the passage of religious processions, as part of the festivities of Ram Navami and Hanuman Jayanti, specifically through Muslim dominated neighborhoods. The report investigated the assaults and shows us that the prime factor for communal violence and riots that occurred in the context of religious processions was the routes that were chosen by the organisers of the processions. Iyer and Shrivastava (2017) show us that religious riots and conflicts have become a tool for political parties to create social divide thus influencing voter behaviour by raising communal issues.

In 2022, both the festivals of Ram Navami and Hanuman Jayanti took place during the month of Ramzan, a holy month for the Muslim community. The processions would target mosques during the times of prayer or during the time the fast was meant to be broken, playing loud hate-filled music in front of mosques and raising slogans. The timing would allow the procession mob to incite confrontation and conflict with a large gathering of people from the Muslim community. We see that the religious processions become what Gaborieau (1985) terms as “Rituals of Provocation” which led to communal violence. Peter van der Veer (1996) states that the riots that occur due to these rituals of provocation are integral in the construction of public space, which further define the conceptions of community within that area. The works of Gaborieau and van der Veer are extremely relevant to the ground reality which the Routes of Wrath report studies. The report indicates that the combination of the saffron mob with weapons, raising of provocative slogans, and loud hate-filled music in Muslim-dominated areas incites violence. The garb of religious festivities is used as a cover to start communal violence which further leads to loss of property, as the shops, homes, and religious places of Muslims are targeted. We see how the public space is constructed in a manner that forces members of the Muslim community to live intimidated by the majority Hindu community. 

The Aftermath of Religious Processions: Examining Fact Finding Reports

It is important to look at the aftermath of some of the recent religious processions that have taken place to understand how the minority community is not only affected during the procession, but also after. The main contention with how religious processions have become weaponized is not the violence and conflict that occurs but the capturing of spaces, villainization, and marginalisation of the Muslim minority community that follows. 

The fact-finding report constituted by the Centre for Study of Society and Secularism (2022) shows how in the case of Khargone (Centre for Study of Society and Secularism 2023) Madhya Pradesh, the communal violence was engineered by the Hindutva militant organisations and the state which had the BJP in power. After the processions, the blame for the communal clashes that took place was placed on the Muslim community by the police and the state administration. They are identified as the instigators of violence by the state administration, with the police filing cases against the Muslim minority members.  The explanation given by the police is that it was members from the Muslim community who disturbed the procession. This logic ignores the communal antics of the procession and the fact that the procession passes through a Muslim-dominated neighbourhood with an intention of intimidation and provocation. 

After the communal violence in Khargone due to the Ram Navami procession, the report shows that intense economic marginalisation of the Muslim community took place, and the community also suffered great losses in terms of property of both homes and commercial establishments. The state-led demolition drives that targeted the commercial establishments and homes of the Muslim community was an attack against the basic requirements of security, livelihood, and shelter making them economically vulnerable. The act of demolition drives became a form of state policy which acted as a form of collective punishment against the minority community.

Another example is of the fact-finding report of the Centre for Study of Society and Secularism (2023) related to the procession violence in Vadodara Gujarat, which shows how during the communal clashes, the procession would purposefully pass through areas of the Muslim community. Members of the VHP who were questioned by the fact-finding team demanded why they should not be allowed to pass through Muslim areas. This tone suggests that there is a sense of entitlement the VHP has to the spaces occupied by the Muslim community even though they knew they did not have the permission to do so. The role of the police is also questionable—as they clearly sided with the state administration and those taking part in the procession. The police were not proactive in stopping the procession from diverting its route and played virtually no role in stopping the violence. Post the violence, the number of First Information Reports filed by the police against the Muslim community far outnumbered those filed against members of the procession who diverted from the route and played a huge role in the violence that unfolded. 

Brajmandal Jalabhishek Yatra 2023: Context and Causes of Violence

The Brajmandal Jalabhishek Yatra was first organised by the VHP in 2021 (Akhtar 2023) with the agenda of reviving ancient Hindu temples and increasing religious tourism in the Mewat area (The Tribune 2023). The yatra begins from the Nalhar Mahadev Temple in Nuh, passing through the Jhir Temple and ending at the Radhe Krishna Mandir in Singhana. The immediate origin of the violence on July 31, 2023, is still contested by both sides. However, both sides agree that there had been an increase in animosity and buildup of tension among the communities before the yatra took place (Association for Protection of Civil Rights 2023). The fact-finding report of the Centre for Study of Secularism and Society (2023) goes into detail about how communalism was stoked before the yatra.

What is important to note is the absence of Nuh’s Superintendent of Police when the violence broke out (The Wire 2023). The lack of police presence was one of the major reasons why such a large-scale incident took place. Due to the lack of police supervision, many incidents of provocation from the side of the religious procession went unchecked and eventually led to violence. As discussed earlier, the carrying of weapons and provocative slogans are features present in religious processions organised by militant Hindutva organisations such as the VHP and Bajrang Dal. The rise in communal tensions due to the video provocation by Monu Manesar, lack of police presence to maintain law and order, presence of weapons, and use of provocative slogans led to chaos which subsequently reached all the way to Gurugram. It is important to first understand what went wrong in 2023, in order to understand how the 2024 iteration of the Brajmandal Jalabhishek Yatra was so different, with the differences being very apparent.

Brajmandal Jalabhishek Yatra 2024: Peaceful Procession under State Supervision

When it was announced that the Brajmandal Jalabhishek Yatra would again take place in 2024, many were concerned due to what had transpired the year before. However, the seriousness with which the administration was monitoring the procession was apparent from the beginning. Before the yatra was to take place on July 22, both the Gurugram and Nuh police had announced that they would be using drones to monitor the yatra and to ensure that no communal escalation took place (The Tribune 2024). Considering what had happened the previous year and how social media was used to spread misinformation about what had taken place, the Haryana government had ordered the suspension of mobile internet and bulk SMS services in the Nuh District (The Hindu 2024). Additionally, over 2,000 personnel from the police and paramilitary were deployed in the region. From Sohna onwards, there were security checks after every 3 kms and armed security personnel were present in key junctions. Another key difference between 2023 and 2024 was the group in charge of organising the yatra. In 2024, the yatra was organised by a composite group consisting of members from the Khap Panchayat and religious leaders, instead of the VHP and the Bajrang Dal (Kissu 2024). The administration had also notified the organisers that permission had only been granted for the yatra and that DJs, loudspeakers, and weapons such as talwars and lathis were prohibited.

The yatris would travel to all three temples using buses, cars, and bikes as the total distance of the yatra, visiting all three temples starting from Nuh, would be around 80 kms.

Post Procession Discussions with Residents of Nuh

After the procession, a series of field interviews were conducted with residents of Nuh who witnessed both the processions of 2023 and 2024. The total sample size was 20 respondents, out of which 15 of the respondents were from the Muslim community and 5 were from the Hindu community. The snowball sampling technique was used to engage with the residents of Nuh in semi-structured interview format, allowing them to describe their observations and understanding of the situation.  Through the discussions with the respondents, we see many themes arise in terms of how the residents of Nuh view the difference in how the state has responded to the processions, actions of the police, and their perception of the procession in general. 

Nationalism as a Defense

In our conversation with the Muslim residents of Nuh after the commencement of the procession, what was very apparent was the guarded manner in which questions were answered. In the case of many respondents, when they were probed about who they felt was responsible for the violence that took place during the procession, the respondents blamed the organisers of the processions who belonged to armed militant organisations such as the Bajrang Dal and VHP. However, with this answer, statements would accompany which described the role of the Meo-Muslims during the independence struggle. The Muslim respondents would describe how the Meo-Muslims refused to transition to Pakistan during the time of partition even though they had the choice to do so. The fact that they did not do so is a display of nationalism. One of the respondents spoke about how the RSS and its members never had a test to display their dedication and commitment to the country, which the Meo-Muslims had done so during the time of partition.

Interviews made clear that nationalism was used as a defense to ward off allegations that Meo-Muslims were against the state and the religious practices of different communities. Nationalism was evoked as a defense and counter to the allegations of communalism that was being placed on the Meo-Muslims. The respondents argued that there was no case of them harbouring ill will against those who would carry out the procession, provided that it was not violent and targeting those who belonged to the Muslim community. Recounting what had taken place during the 2023 procession, one of the respondents spoke about how the loudspeakers were playing obnoxious music which was targeted against the Muslim community and he asked how it is that the Meo-Muslims were being labelled as anti-national and communal. It is clear that in the case of communal violence, the commitment of the Muslim community is always brought into question as part of right-wing anti-minority discourse. Thus, to counter this, the proof of burden of displaying one’s nationalism falls on the Muslim community.

Brotherhood across Faiths within the Context of Nuh

When both the Muslim and Hindu respondents were asked about the nature of relationship that existed between the communities, both sides denied any case of ill will between the locals who were residing in Nuh. One of the respondents said that the beedi from which a Meo-Muslim smokes is the same from which a Hindu shares, brushing off any case of enmity that would be assumed would be present due to the scale of violence that took place. On the topic of brotherhood, one of the Hindu respondents stated that the Kanwar Yatra passed through Nuh every year and each year the Muslim residents would set up tents to welcome and provide hospitality to the yatris. He also added that the village had a culture of sharing festivals among its residents—during Eid Muslims would invite their Hindu neighbours, and the Hindus would do the same during the time of their festivities.

When one of the Muslim respondents was asked about whether there have been cases of segregation between the Muslim and Hindu community after the violence of 2023, he responded saying that the neighbour he had for 30 years (who was a Hindu) was still his neighbour, asking why would any conflict ever arise with his neighbour. While discussing the nature of violence that took place in 2023, a Hindu respondent spoke about how due to the violence he was not able to return to his residence. At this time, his neighbour had offered him refuge and told him to stay till the time the violence subsided. What was clear from the respondents was an emphasis on how the lives of the residents who stayed in Nuh was interconnected in terms of dependence from an economic and social perspective. Many of the residents of Nuh, though hailing from different religious backgrounds, were in business with each other in terms of working together and purchasing amenities or services from the other. Due to the economic and social interdependence, the prospect of enmity between the communities did not arise, even after the violence in 2023. This was also mainly due to the fact that both communities attributed the cause of violence to outsiders.

How Is the State Perceived? Who Is the State Safeguarding?

There was a marked difference in how the state was perceived in the responses that came from the members of the Hindu and Muslim community. While both the communities did not attribute the causes of violence to the residents of Nuh, who they believed was responsible for the violence was different. The Hindu respondents believed that the administration and police had not sufficiently curtailed those who aimed to disrupt the procession in 2023 and had pelted stones at yatris. They believed that the state had failed to stop those outsider Muslims who had come to Nuh with the objective of disrupting the procession due to it being linked with individuals such as Monu Manesar. The Muslim respondents blamed the state for allowing the procession to take place in the manner in which it did, being inflammatory and displaying communal characteristics that were extremely provocative in nature. They also blamed the state for being biased towards the members of the procession, as the whole onus of the violence was placed on members of the Muslim community. This was apparent in terms of who was arrested by the police and whose properties were demolished.

In the case of 2024, we do not see the Hindu or Muslim respondents viewing the state as an antagonist figure. Both communities were in praise of the manner in which the state had handled the event without any case of conflict or violence. When the respondents were asked who they felt the state was trying to safeguard and if they felt the state was against either the procession or the Muslim residents of Nuh it had earlier defamed, both sides responded by saying that the state had simply done its duty this time in terms of handling the procession. This shows that neither of the communities viewed the state as an antagonistic actor due to the simple fact that it had carried out its duty without any bias or prejudice. Hence, we can see that the perception of the state and the characteristics attributed to it depend heavily on the manner in which the state operates and carries out its duties.

Religious Rituals in Public Spaces

When the Hindu respondents were asked about what they felt about the procession and whether it had any ritual significance to them, they agreed that the procession was fairly new in terms of its inception. During earlier times, a much smaller procession would be carried out only by the locals of Nuh towards the Shiv Mandir however, now it has become a large-scale event attracting many members from outside. Conversations with the residents of Nuh revealed that most of the Yatra participants came from states such as Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. While they were not opposed to the nature of the procession in its present form, they did agree to the fact that it was not an established ritual and had been taken over by organisations and individuals from outside of Nuh. When asked about the inflammatory slogans and songs that were used in 2023, one of the Hindu respondents responded by saying that there is no place for that in religious practice and that there were malicious elements present. He contrasted the 2023 procession with the one that took place the next year, saying that the change in the organizing committee made a huge difference in terms of the spirituality that was associated with the procession. He claimed that the 2023 procession felt more like a political rally in contrast to the procession of 2024, which paid heed to ritual significance and an actual celebration of God.

The Muslim respondents felt that the processions of 2023 and 2024 carried elements within that highlighted how it was not a pure religious ritual. In both years, with one being marked with violence, there were cases of sloganeering that was political in nature and had anti-Muslim sentiments. One of the Muslim respondents put emphasis on the fact that even if religious rituals or celebrations take place in public spaces, why should it have to attempt to antagonize members of a different community. During the discussion, he stated that it was clear from both the years, that due to this procession not being an established religious practice and due to it earlier being organised by the VHP and Bajrang Dal, it still had remnants of provocative attitudes from the outsider participants.

Conclusion

In the Brajmandal Jalabhishek Yatra, the attitude of the state, involvement of militant Hindutva groups in the organisation of the procession, and presence of weapons and loudspeakers play a huge role in turning a religious procession into a communal clash. The most important role is the one played by the administration and the police, who decide through their vigilance whether violence will occur or not. In 2022, multiple processions took place in Telangana, and none resulted in violence unlike in the other states. The major reason for this being that the state had the political will to ensure that law and order would be maintained. The 2024 Brajmandal Jalabhishek Yatra is a good example of that. Apart from political will, another important development that took place in between both iterations of the Brajmandal Jalabhishek Yatra of 2023 and 2024 was changing sociopolitical conditions due to the election results of 2024, where the Bharatiya Janata Party lost its outright majority in parliament. As the Routes of Wrath report (2023) shows, states where the Bharatiya Janata Party was in power saw higher rates of violence through religious processions and inaction from the side of the administration and the police. Further study could examine the connection between who is in power at the Centre and the way communal clashes take place through religious processions. 

From interviews with the residents of Nuh following the procession, it is clear that the social and economic ties between the residents of Nuh had not been severed due to the processional violence. What is apparent is the role of outsiders who attempt to create discord and animosity in the name of religion. As Paul Brass theorised about Institutionalised Riot Systems (2004), we can see politicised processions being carried out in the name of religion which possess an agenda of impacting the social and economic ties between the residents of a certain area. While in the case of Nuh, this did not succeed, there are many other contexts where post violence the social relations between members of different communities have worsened. 

It is apparent that violence during processions is rarely random or spontaneous. It is fostered and encouraged by many factors, the most prominent being the state and the agenda with which the procession is being carried out. We will end with a quote from Dr. Peter van de Veer (1996) in his paper “Riots and Rituals: The Construction of Violence and Public Space in Hindu Nationalism” where he writes, “Those who perpetrate the violence are often characterized as ‘fanatic’ members of mobs led astray by irresponsible leaders. It is this discourse which obfuscates the important connections between riots and rituals in the modern world.” Looking at the case study of Nuh, it is clear that communal violence on scale only takes place due to the blessing of the state. While the initial stages of violence may or may not have been initiated by the state, how communal clash progresses and its increase in scale is caused by the state taking an active decision whether to stop or facilitate incidents of violence. In the current sociopolitical context, it is in the BJP’s favour to allow such incidents of violence to take place. Applying the theorization of Sudha Pai and Sajjan Kumar (2018) in the context of religious processions, the communal clashes post processions are used to maintain anti-Muslim prejudice among Hindus. Another additional element is the polarization of the Hindu community by portraying communal clashes during processions as events where the Muslim community is opposed to the religious sentiments and traditions of the majority Hindu community. This allows for the legitimisation of the majoritarian rule under the BJP and continues the cycle of violence to ensure their political might.

References

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Barnett, Richard B. 1980. North India Between Empires: Awadh, the Mughals, and the British, 1720 – 1801. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

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